ABSTRACT. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly becoming a popular business concept in developed economies. As typical of other business concepts, it is on its way to globalization through practices and structures of the globalized capitalist world order, typified in Multinational Corporations (MNCs). However, CSR often sits uncomfortably in this capitalist world order, as MNCs are often challenged by the global reach of their supply chains and the possible irresponsible practices inherent along these chains. The possibility of irresponsible practices puts global firms under pressure to protect their brands even if it means assuming responsibilities for the practices of their suppliers. Pressure groups understand this burden on firms and try to take advantage of the situation. This article seeks to challenge the often taken-for-granted-assumption that firms should be accountable for the practices of their suppliers by espousing the moral (and sometimes legal) underpinnings of the concept of responsibility. Except where corporate control and or corporate grouping exist, it identifies the use of power as a critical factor to be considered in allocating responsibility in firm-supplier relationship; and suggests that the more powerful in this relationship has a responsibility to exert some moral influence on the weaker party. The article highlights the use of code of conducts, corporate culture, anti-pressure group campaigns, personnel training and value reorientation as possible sources of wielding positive moral influence along supply chains.
Introduction
The stakeholder theory of corporate social responsibility (CSR) emphasises a broad set of social responsibilities for business. Stakeholders, as used in this theory, refer to those individuals or groups who may affect or are affected by the organisation (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984 Freeman, , 1994 . They include a wide variety of interests, and as suggested by Mullins (2002) , may be grouped under six main headings: employees, shareholders, consumers, government, community and the environment, as well as groups such as suppliers, trade unions, business associates and even competitors. In this regard, CSR can be broadly defined as an organisation's commitment to operate in an economically and environmentally sustainable manner while recognising the interests of its stakeholders.
1
In line with this broader definition of CSR, global brands like Nike, GAP, Adidas and McDonalds are often under intense pressure from groups working for responsible supply chain management. Much of this pressure is channelled through the supply chain, since the pressure groups sometimes find it difficult to reach the global brands directly. To this end, they rely on indirect tactics such as targeting the sourcing activities of these brands and their seeming exploitation of cheap labour conditions in developing countries. These attacks, which have been quite successful in recent times, hack on the reputation of these firms (e.g. Nike's case).
2 They engender negative public sentiments and invariably resentments towards the global brands following ''irresponsible'' behaviours along their supply chain. These negative perceptions of firms persist, irrespective of the locus of the ''guilty'' suppliers on the supply chain spectrum of the primary purchasing firm. This image tends to put firms under pressure to bear indefinite There seems to be a widespread agreement on some form of corporate responsibility for social issues. Nevertheless, the critical question is how to define or limit the scope of such responsibility within the context of the operations of MNCs. The enormity of corporate multinational power makes this an urgent and important task. The general conception of corporate social responsibility is extralegal (McWilliams and Siegel 2001) . Apart from corporate social responsibility reports, firms including MNCs now appear to adhere to one code of conduct or the other. These codes are usually voluntary initiatives by the firms, either alone or in association with other firms in the same or similar industry. Sometimes, other participants such as pressure groups and civil societies make input to the contents of such codes. However, most corporate codes of conduct have not properly addressed the issue of defining the limit of corporate responsibility for the activities of another corporation. For instance, The Apparel Industry Code of Conduct for U.S.-based clothing and accessories corporations imposes a ''duty'' on such enterprises to ensure compliance with the code by their contractors, subcontractors, suppliers and licensees.
3 This is clearly a nebulous obligation. Does this ''duty'' extend to all the levels and actors in the supply chain, irrespective of proximity or remoteness from the firm or MNC? Can the ''duty'' be applied to a situation where the MNC is not even in a position to control or influence a ''member'' of the supply chain? Is unlimited exposure to social responsibility a good idea for the business environment? How does social responsibility fit in with the concepts of corporate legal personality and independent existence of corporations? Is reconciliation possible?
One of the negative consequences of this pressure approach towards CSR adopted by pressure groups is the tendency to (inadvertently) promote the false notion that CSR practice is restricted only to global big firms and brands. Since most of the firms along the supply chains are likely to be Small and Medium scale Enterprises (SMEs), this approach also exhibits the tendency of giving an inaccurate impression that SMEs are somehow shielded from engaging in CSR practices, which runs against the ethos of the CSR movement. In the contrary, there is a rising call for SMEs to participate in both CSR discourse and practice as well (Petts, 1998; Sarbutts, 2003; Spence, 1999) . This is where and why we think that arguing for and highlighting the limits of CSR practices along supply chains of global brands could be a way to curtail the excesses of pressure groups and their antics, while urging SMEs to be equally socially responsible.
This article, therefore, examines if firms should be responsible for the practices of their suppliers, the extent of this responsibility and how they could effectively translate such responsibilities, if any, into practice. The article starts by situating firm-supplier relationships within the broader context of firm buying behaviour; and from that context evaluates the responsibilities of firms as 'customers' to their suppliers. Quite often, the fact that purchasing firms are customers is ignored in debates around responsible supply chain management. The article does not focus on such ethical issues in purchasing as: deception, bribery, price rigging, unsafe products and public safety (Wood, 1996:185) , since these are likely to arise from the internal environment of the purchasing firm and not necessarily from its relationship with the suppliers. In addition, it does not consider the intricacies of the economic dynamics characteristic of firm-supplier relationships. It focuses solely on espousing the moral (and sometimes legal) connotations of the concept of responsibility and what it means to be held responsible while relating these to firm-supplier relationships. In the main, the article attempts to set limits to responsibility in a supplier relationship by introducing the concepts of corporate control and corporate grouping as critical factors.
Responsibility as accountability: meaning, clarifications and exceptions
From ancient times, philosophers have struggled to unravel the wealth of meanings embedded in the term 'responsibility' or the expression 'to be held responsible'. The term and the expression are both associated with the concept of morality. This is not
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